- Seminar Calendar
- Seminar Archive
- 2024-2025 Semester 2
- 2024-2025 Semester 1
- 2023-2024 Semester 2
- 2023-2024 Semester 1
- 2022-2023 Semester 2
- 2022-2023 Semester 1
- 2021-2022 Semester 2
- 2021-2022 Semester 1
- 2020-2021 Semester 2
- 2020-2021 Semester 1
- 2019-2020 Semester 2
- 2019-2020 Semester 1
- 2018-2019 Semester 2
- 2018-2019 Semester 1
- 2017-2018 Semester 2
- 2017-2018 Semester 1
- 2016-2017 Semester 2
- 2016-2017 Semester 1
- 2015-2016 Semester 1
- 2015-2016 Semester 2
- 2014-2015 Semester 2
- 2014-2015 Semester 1
- 2013-2014 Semester 2
- 2013-2014 Semester 1
- 2012-2013 Semester 2
- 2012-2013 Semester 1
- 2011-2012 Semester 2
- 2011-2012 Semester 1
- 2010-2011 Semester 2
- 2010-2011 Semester 1
- 2009-2010 Semester 2
- 2009-2010 Semester 1
- 2008-2009 Semester 2
- 2008-2009 Semester 1
- 2007-2008 Semester 2
- 2007-2008 Semester 1
- 2006-2007 Semester 2
- 2006-2007 Semester 1
- 2005-2006 Semester 2
- 2005-2006 Semester 1
- Contact
- Site Map
Revenue Management Games with Government Mandate
Seminar
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------
Title : Revenue Management Games with Government Mandate
Speaker : Prof. Jianqiang Hu
Fudan University
Date : Feb. 22th, 2013 (Friday)
Time : 4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Venue : Room 513
William M.W. Mong Engineering Building
CUHK
------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------ --
Abstract:
In 2007, the Chinese aviation authority asked the five airlines that offer service between Shanghai and Beijing to form an express shuttle alliance so that tickets from one airline could be used for any flight offered by all other airlines. In this paper, we will study the impact of such a government mandate on the competitiveness of the market and airline operations. We first extend the competitive airline seat allocation model proposed by Netessine and Shumsky (2005) to include such a government mandate and then provide sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibriums in such a model. Both analytical and numerical results show that less low-fare seats would be made available in a market with the government mandate, and furthermore revenues of airlines would be lower as well. Finally, we discuss how the government mandate should be designed so that the market could operate as efficiently as possible.
This is a joint work with Chenbo Zhu.
Biography:
J.Q. Hu is a Professor with the Department of Management Science, School of Management, Fudan University. He received his B.S. degree in applied mathematics from Fudan University, China, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in applied mathematics from Harvard University. He was an Associate Professor with the Department of Mechanical Engineering and the Division of Systems Engineering at Boston University before joining Fudan University.
His research interests include discrete-event stochastic systems, simulation, queuing network theory, stochastic control theory, with applications towards supply chain management, risk management in financial markets and derivatives, and communication networks. He has published over 80 research papers and is a co-author of the book, Conditional Monte Carlo: Gradient Estimation and Optimization Applications (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), which won the 1998 Outstanding Simulation Publication Award from INFORMS College on Simulation.
************************* ALL ARE WELCOME ************************
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
------------------------------
Title : Revenue Management Games with Government Mandate
Speaker : Prof. Jianqiang Hu
Fudan University
Date : Feb. 22th, 2013 (Friday)
Time : 4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Venue : Room 513
William M.W. Mong Engineering Building
CUHK
------------------------------
Abstract:
In 2007, the Chinese aviation authority asked the five airlines that offer service between Shanghai and Beijing to form an express shuttle alliance so that tickets from one airline could be used for any flight offered by all other airlines. In this paper, we will study the impact of such a government mandate on the competitiveness of the market and airline operations. We first extend the competitive airline seat allocation model proposed by Netessine and Shumsky (2005) to include such a government mandate and then provide sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibriums in such a model. Both analytical and numerical results show that less low-fare seats would be made available in a market with the government mandate, and furthermore revenues of airlines would be lower as well. Finally, we discuss how the government mandate should be designed so that the market could operate as efficiently as possible.
This is a joint work with Chenbo Zhu.
Biography:
J.Q. Hu is a Professor with the Department of Management Science, School of Management, Fudan University. He received his B.S. degree in applied mathematics from Fudan University, China, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in applied mathematics from Harvard University. He was an Associate Professor with the Department of Mechanical Engineering and the Division of Systems Engineering at Boston University before joining Fudan University.
His research interests include discrete-event stochastic systems, simulation, queuing network theory, stochastic control theory, with applications towards supply chain management, risk management in financial markets and derivatives, and communication networks. He has published over 80 research papers and is a co-author of the book, Conditional Monte Carlo: Gradient Estimation and Optimization Applications (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), which won the 1998 Outstanding Simulation Publication Award from INFORMS College on Simulation.
************************* ALL ARE WELCOME ************************
Tel : (852) 3943-8327
Email : nchen@se.cuhk.edu.hk
Enquiries : Prof. Li Lingfei
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
CUHK
Website : http://seminar.se.cuhk.edu.hk
Email : seem5202@se.cuhk.edu.hk
Enquiries : Prof. Li Lingfei
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
CUHK
Website : http://seminar.se.cuhk.edu.hk
Email : seem5202@se.cuhk.edu.hk
Date:
Friday, February 22, 2013 - 08:30 to 09:30