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Seminar: Why Entrepreneurial Firms Behave Differently From Large Firms? -- A Perspective From Time-inconsistent Preferences
Seminar
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Title : Why Entrepreneurial Firms Behave Differently From Large Firms? -- A Perspective From Time-inconsistent Preferences
Speaker : Prof. Masaaki Kijima
Date : Nov. 26th, 2012 (Monday)
Time : 4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Venue : Room 513
William M.W. Mong Engineering Building
CUHK
Abstract:
Based on a continuous-time model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, this paper provides an analytically tractable framework of entrepreneurial firms' investment and capital structure decisions with time-inconsistent preferences. We show that the impact of time-inconsistent preferences on investment depends not only on the financing structures (all-equity financing or debt financing), but also on the entrepreneurs' belief regarding their future time-inconsistent behavior (sophisticated or naive). Time-inconsistent preferences delay investment under both all-equity financing and debt financing. However, the impact is weakened with debt financing, because debt financing increases the payoff value upon investment and accelerates investment.Naive entrepreneurs invest later and default earlier than sophisticated entrepreneurs, leading to a shorter operating period.
Moreover, we find that naive entrepreneurs may choose higher leverage, while sophisticated entrepreneurs always choose lower leverage, compared to the time-consistent benchmark. These results support the empirical findings in entrepreneurial finance.
Biography:
Masaaki Kijima is a Professor of Finance at Graduate School of Social Sciences,
Tokyo Metropolitan University. He received PhD from the Simon business school, University of
Rochester in 1986. Since then, he has held multiple professorships with the leading economic and
mathematical departments, including Tokyo Institute of Technology and Kyoto University. He has written more than 95 academic papers and authored two books to international acclaim. He serves as a council member of Bachelier Finance Society, an advisory committee member of Society for Computational Economics, and an associate editor of Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
************************* ALL ARE WELCOME ************************
Host : Prof. Chen Nan
Tel : (852) 3943-8327
Email : nchen@se.cuhk.edu.hk
Enquiries : Prof. Hong Cheng
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
CUHK
Website : http://seminar.se.cuhk.edu.hk
Email : seem5201@se.cuhk.edu.hk
Date:
Monday, November 26, 2012 - 08:30 to 09:30