- Seminar Calendar
- Seminar Archive
- 2024-2025 Semester 2
- 2024-2025 Semester 1
- 2023-2024 Semester 2
- 2023-2024 Semester 1
- 2022-2023 Semester 2
- 2022-2023 Semester 1
- 2021-2022 Semester 2
- 2021-2022 Semester 1
- 2020-2021 Semester 2
- 2020-2021 Semester 1
- 2019-2020 Semester 2
- 2019-2020 Semester 1
- 2018-2019 Semester 2
- 2018-2019 Semester 1
- 2017-2018 Semester 2
- 2017-2018 Semester 1
- 2016-2017 Semester 2
- 2016-2017 Semester 1
- 2015-2016 Semester 1
- 2015-2016 Semester 2
- 2014-2015 Semester 2
- 2014-2015 Semester 1
- 2013-2014 Semester 2
- 2013-2014 Semester 1
- 2012-2013 Semester 2
- 2012-2013 Semester 1
- 2011-2012 Semester 2
- 2011-2012 Semester 1
- 2010-2011 Semester 2
- 2010-2011 Semester 1
- 2009-2010 Semester 2
- 2009-2010 Semester 1
- 2008-2009 Semester 2
- 2008-2009 Semester 1
- 2007-2008 Semester 2
- 2007-2008 Semester 1
- 2006-2007 Semester 2
- 2006-2007 Semester 1
- 2005-2006 Semester 2
- 2005-2006 Semester 1
- Contact
- Site Map
Deep Learning for Stackelberg Mean Field Games via Single-Level Reformulation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Friday, March 7, 4:30 pm – 5:30 pm
Venue: ERB 513, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Title: Deep Learning for Stackelberg Mean Field Games via Single-Level
Reformulation
Speaker: Professor Mathieu Laurière, NYU Shanghai
Abstract: We propose a single-level numerical approach to solve
Stackelberg mean field game (MFG) problems. In Stackelberg MFG, an
infinite population of agents play a non-cooperative game and choose
their controls to optimize their individual objectives while
interacting with the principal and other agents through the population
distribution. The principal can influence the mean field Nash
equilibrium at the population level through policies, and she
optimizes her own objective, which depends on the population
distribution. This leads to a bi-level problem between the principal
and mean field of agents that cannot be solved using traditional
methods for MFGs. We propose a reformulation of this problem as a
single-level mean field optimal control problem through a penalization
approach, and we prove convergence of the reformulated problem to the
original problem. We propose a machine learning method based on neural
networks and illustrate it with several examples from the literature,
including with applications to finance. Joint work with Gökçe Dayanikli.
Bio: Mathieu Laurière is an Assistant Professor of Mathematics and
Data Science at NYU Shanghai. Prior to joining NYU Shanghai, he was a
Postdoctoral Research Associate at Princeton University in the
Operations Research and Financial Engineering (ORFE) department and a
Visiting Faculty Researcher at Google Brain. He obtained his MS from
Sorbonne University and ENS Paris-Saclay and his PhD from the
University of Paris. Before joining Princeton University, he was a
Postdoctoral Fellow at the NYU-ECNU Institute of Mathematical Sciences
at NYU Shanghai.
Date:
Friday, March 7, 2025 - 16:30 to 17:30