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Seminar: Dynamic Information Manipulation Game
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Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
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Date: 4:30pm - 5:30pm on 12 September (Friday)
Venue: ERB 513, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Title: Dynamic Information Manipulation Game
Speaker: Shutian Liu, Department of Systems Engineering, City University
of Hong Kong
Abstract:
We propose a dynamic information manipulation game (DIMG) to investigate
the incentives of an information manipulator (IM) to influence the
transition rules of a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP). DIMG is a hierarchical game where the upper-level IM stealthily
designs the POMDP’s joint state distributions to influence the
lower-level controller’s actions. DIMG’s fundamental feature is
characterized by a stagewise constraint that ensures the consistency
between the unobservable marginals of the manipulated and the original
kernels. In an equilibrium of information distortion, the IM minimizes
cumulative cost that depends on the controller’s informationally
manipulated actions generated by the optimal policy to the POMDP. We
discuss ex ante and interim manipulation schemes and show their
connections. The effect of manipulation on the performance of control
policies is analyzed through its influence on belief distortion.
Biography:
Shutian Liu is an Assistant Professor with the Department of Systems
Engineering at City University of Hong Kong. Prior to joining CityU HK,
he obtained Ph.D. from the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering at New York University, M.S. from the Department of
Electrical Engineering at Columbia University, and B.E. from the
Department of Automation at Tsinghua University. His research interests
lie in game theory, optimization and control theory, risk analytics,
networks, and their applications in multidisciplinary areas such as
adversarial AI, socio-technical systems security, human factors,
misinformation, and public health.
Date:
Friday, September 12, 2025 - 16:30 to 17:30


